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Abstract 
 
During the conflict in Vietnam, married men with dependents could obtain a deferment 
from the draft. In 1965, following President Johnson’s Executive Order 11241 and a 
subsequent Selective Service System announcement, the particulars of this policy 
changed substantially in a way which provided strong incentives for childless American 
couples to conceive a first-born child. This study examines the effects of the intervention 
on the decision to start a family. In my empirical analysis, I use data from the Vital 
Statistics for the period 1963-1968 and employ a difference-in-differences methodology. 
The estimated magnitude of the effect is substantial.  
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Background 
During the conflict in Vietnam, men between 18½ and 25 years of age were 
subject to the draft.  Several exemptions to this rule existed.  For example, students were 
exempt.  Importantly for the purposes of this study, married men with dependents could 
also obtain a deferment from the draft, and the particulars of this policy underwent 
substantial changes in the 1960’s.  In August 1965, President Johnson issued Executive 
Order 11241, which formally eliminated deferments for childless men who got married 
after August 26, 1965, and, in October 1965, the Selective Service declared that childless 
married men (irrespective of the date of marriage) were to be called up.  Both 
announcements came as a surprise (The New York Times, 1965a).  Since married men 
with children remained exempt, the declarations provided a strong incentive for young 
couples to conceive a (first-born) child.  Before August 1965, marriage had been a 
sufficient condition for a deferment.  Even just a few hours before the August 26 
midnight deadline, desperate couples tried to make use of this provision by quickly 
scheduling their wedding.  Between August and October, couples that had missed the 
deadline had to satisfy an additional condition – conceiving a child.  Childless men who 
got married in this period were still subject to the draft and so had an incentive to 
conceive a child.  In October 1965, the risk of induction was further extended to all 
couples that had remained childless.  Finally, in April 1970, the family deferments were 
entirely eliminated by Executive Order 11527 (The Selective Service System 2004). 
Past research has demonstrated that taxes and expenditure programs can affect 
fertility (e.g., Whittington et al 1990; see also Milligan 2005 for an excellent review) as 
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well as the timing of delivery (Dickert-Conlin and Chandra 1999).  The goal of this paper 
is to provide additional evidence on the responsiveness of childbearing to incentives 
embedded in public policy by studying a dramatic yet unexamined government 
intervention - the effects of the Vietnam War paternity deferments on the decision to 
conceive a first-born child.  As discussed in the popular press, Vice President Dick 
Cheney’s first daughter, Elizabeth, was born nine months and two days after the Selective 
Service System announced that childless married men were to be drafted (The Boston 
Globe 2000, Slate Chatterbox 2004).  Did draft eligible men strategically react to the 
announcement?  And, if so, how widespread and fast was the response? 
To my knowledge, no one has investigated the impacts of the Vietnam draft on 
natality.  By using the Vietnam draft rules to identify a causal effect, however, I build on 
several prior studies.  Joshua Angrist, for example, uses the exogeneity of the Vietnam 
draft rules to identify the effects of military service on lifetime earnings (Angrist 1990, 
Angrist and Chen 2007) and to measure the racial differences in the value of military 
service (Angrist 1991).  Gullason (1989) and Card and Lemieux (2001, 2002) estimate 
the effects of the Vietnam draft on schooling explicitly recognizing that college 
attendance often served as a vehicle to avoid the draft.  Both studies find a significant 
effect of the probability of being drafted on school enrollment. 
The fact that the changes in the Selective Service rules were both unexpected and 
widely publicized makes this an ideal example to study the effects of policy on fertility 
decisions.  Milligan (2005) argues that the assumptions made about the timing of the 
response to policy are arbitrary since a reaction will be delayed not only by a nine-month 
gestational lag but also by the time necessary for the diffusion of information about the 
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change in policy.  In the case examined here, however, the criticism seems less relevant.  
Newspaper clippings from August 27, 1965 suggest that the issuance of the Executive 
Order 11241 did receive broad attention.  For example, the story was listed on the front 
pages of The New York Times (1965c) and The Washington Post (1965b).  The benefits 
of becoming a father were made explicit: “From now on, a draft-age man who gets 
married and becomes a father before being called into service will go into the same 
deferred class as other fathers.” (The Washington Post, 1965b, p. A12)  Similarly, on 
October 27, 1965, one day after the Selective Service declared that childless married men 
were to be called up, the top U.S. newspapers commented on the policy change (The New 
York Times, 1965a; The Washington Post, 1965a).1  It is reasonable to assume that the 
general public was well aware of the news. 
Also, given the urgency of the situation for the potential draftees, any behavioral 
response was likely to be fast.  In the mid 1960’s, the risk of induction facing young 
American men was increasing dramatically.  In the year 1965, when the new policies 
were announced, the number of men inducted each month increased by more than sixfold 
from less than 6,000 to nearly 39,000 (Figure 1).  And, as anecdotal evidence suggests, 
young couples were ready to react almost immediately.  For example, after President 
Johnson’s Executive Order was issued on August 26, 1965 limiting the eligibility for 
marital deferments to men married on or before that date, many couples quickly 
                                                 
1 Unfortunately, only a few transcripts of television news are available for years prior to 1968 (Vanderbilt 
Television News Archive, NBC News Archive, and Burrell’s Transcript Service) and none of them is 
relevant to the issue at hand.  
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scheduled their wedding in order to beat the midnight deadline (The New York Times, 
1965b). 
Finally, information about the fecundity of the U.S. population in the early 1960’s 
confirms that young women were, on average, able to conceive a child quickly.  In the 
year 1960, 52% of Americans 20-24 years old were able to conceive within a month from 
trying and 77% were successful within two months (Crist 2004).  Thus, a fast and 
relatively strong reaction to the Executive Order issuance and the Selective Service 
announcement is realistic.  
Data and Methods 
To empirically investigate the effects of the Vietnam draft on natality, I focus on 
the impacts of President Johnson’s Executive Order 11241 and the October 1965 
Selective Service announcement and make use of the fact that these policies affected 
different groups of young men differently.  In particular, I use a difference-in-differences 
type of approach and compare the effects of the policy changes on the behavior of 
treatment and control groups of young men. 
Ideally, all American men in the draft-eligible age would constitute the treatment 
group.  Unfortunately, however, the dataset most suitable for the study – the Vital 
Statistics of the United States (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 1963-
77) – does not provide detailed information on paternal characteristics.2  Therefore, I use 
                                                 
2 I have explored several micro datasets but none of them was suitable for this study.   For example, the 
Natality Detail File series only started in the year 1968.  The Current Population Survey reports age in 
years but not the month of birth (making it impossible to focus on children as respondents) and only asks 
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maternal age as a proxy for the father’s age and adjust for the possibility of bias due to 
misclassification of some women into the treatment and/or control group.  A new 
adjustment method developed in Lewbel (2003) is ideal for the purpose at hand and is 
described in more detail in “Correction for Misclassification” and the Technical 
Appendix below.  It is worth foreshadowing here that the unadjusted results are 
conservative since any misclassification into the treatment and/or control group will bias 
the estimated treatment effect downward. 
The Vital Statistics report the number of births for the following age cohorts: 
under 15 years, 15-19 years, 20-24 years, 25-29 years, 30-34 years, 35-39 years, 40-44 
years, 45-49 years, and 50 years and over.  In my baseline model, I use women 20-24 
years old as the treatment group since only men up to 25 years of age were eligible for 
the draft and since women, on average, tend to be younger than their partners (Table 1).  I 
exclude teenagers from the baseline analysis since women under 15 years of age were 
unlikely to be affected by the government policy and since mothers 15-19 years old seem 
diverse with respect to their fertility responsiveness (the attitudes towards family 
planning will likely differ among women in this group).  Also, my calculations suggest 
that between 17.3% (year 1963) and 26.7% (year 1968) of mothers 15-19 years old were 
                                                                                                                                                 
females questions related to fertility (making it impossible to link children to their fathers and to focus on 
fathers as respondents).  The National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men (NLSYM) includes information 
on individuals 14 to 24 years old in the year 1966 but contains no appropriate control group.  Also, the 
sample size in the NLSYM is too small to permit reliable inferences from a stratified analysis (for example, 
in the summer of 1966, sampled men 19-24 years old had only 22 first-born children).  The Childbirth and 
Adoption History File of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics collected since 1985 does not contain 
enough first births in the control group to support reliable difference-in-differences estimation. 
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single in the period under study.  The corresponding estimates are 5.7% and 8.3% for 
mothers 20-24 years old.3  In an alternative specification, I add teenagers (15 to 19 years 
old) to the treatment group.  Women 25-29 years old - with husbands likely to be 26 
years old or older and thus ineligible for the Vietnam draft – comprise the control group. 
To assess the validity of my treatment and control groups, I use the U.S. Natality 
Detail Files for the years 1969-19714 and calculate the percentages of fathers 19 to 25 
years old (the draft eligible cohort) by maternal age (Table 2).  Maternal age is a 
reasonably good proxy for paternal age.  In particular, 65% of mothers 20 to 24 years old 
(the baseline treatment group) had babies with fathers 19 to 25 years old in each of the 
years 1969, 1970, and 1971.  The corresponding percentage was 68% for women 15 to 24 
years old (an alternative treatment group) and 11% for mothers in the 25 to 29 year old 
cohort (the control group).  As I discuss shortly, these misclassification probabilities 
derived from an alternative dataset prove useful in adjusting the baseline difference-in-
differences estimates. 
Since the existence of children rather than their number played a role in 
determining draft eligibility, I focus on the birth of a first-born child when estimating the 
effects of the Executive Order and the Selective Service announcement.  Also, the 
outcome measure needs to be corrected for the overall effects of the war on fertility.  In 
particular, it needs to isolate the potential changes in the number of first births in reaction 
                                                 
3 Source: http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/statab/t941x18.pdf, 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/statab/t941x19.pdf, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/statab/t941x07.pdf, and 
http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/pre-1980/PE-11.html; Accessed 03/19/2006. 
 
4 These are the first years when the age of both parents was recorded. 
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to the new deferment rules from the overall changes in natality in a country where many 
young men had been sent to war.5  Therefore, I use the age-specific ratio of the number 
of first-born infants to all infants (reported by month and year of delivery) as the 
dependent variable.  If the 1965 declarations had a significant effect on the fertility 
behavior of the potential draftees, the “first-born infants/all infants” ratio should increase 
in the summer of 1966 (about 9 months after the policy changes were enacted) for 
women in the treatment group and stay unchanged (or to increase less) for women in the 
control group.  Thus, a comparison of the monthly “first-born infants/all infants” series 
(purged of a linear time trend and seasonal variation) for the treatment and control groups 
yields an estimate of the causal relationship between the new government draft policies 
and fertility.  In some of my robustness checks below, I verify that the number of 
subsequent births is not driving my results.  In particular, I directly show that there is no 
effect of the paternity deferments on the number of subsequent births and also decompose 
the “first –born infants/all infants” ratio in order to allow for a more flexible functional 
form.  All of these specification checks support the robustness of the baseline results. 
More formally, the baseline model is set up as follows: 
 
Ytj = α + β*Tj + γ*Mt + δ*Tj*Mt + εtj, 
 
where  t  indexes time periods (months from January 1963 to December 1968) and  j  
indexes cohorts (treatment or control).  Y  is the detrended and deseasonalized “first-born 
infants/all infants” ratio,  T  is a dummy variable denoting the treatment group 
                                                 
5 At its peak in April 1969, the U.S. participation in Vietnam involved 543,000 troops 
(http://www.history.navy.mil/wars/foabroad.htm; Accessed 07/23/2007). 
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membership (age 20-24 in the baseline specification), and  M  is a vector of dummy 
variables, one for each month following the first policy change (August 1965).  T*M  are 
interaction dummies denoting the treatment group membership in months following the 
policy changes, and  ε  is an error term.  In the above model, the estimated δ’s on months 
9 and 10 after each policy change are the difference-in-differences estimates of interest. 
Results 
Descriptive Analysis 
Figure 2 plots the proportions of first births for American women 20 to 24 and 25 
to 29 years old by month and year of delivery.  From 1963 to 1968, the two ratios grew 
about linearly with only small deviations from the trend.  The series, however, exhibited 
a spike in the summer of 1966 – approximately nine months after the new draft policies 
were announced.  As hypothesized, the spike was more remarkable for the younger 
cohort. 
Based on the descriptive analysis, it seems reasonable to focus on the relatively 
stable period from January 1963 to December 1968 when estimating the effects of the 
new draft policy on fertility.  This time period includes several years preceding the 
Executive Order 11241 issuance (pre-August 1965) as well as several years following the 
expected effects of the new policies on fertility (post-July/August 1966).  Limiting the 
period studied to the mid-1960’s also simplifies the analysis by avoiding the substantial 
changes to the draft process associated with the introduction of the draft lottery in late 
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1969.6  Finally, a relatively short follow up is sufficient for studying the immediate 
decision of affected young couples to conceive a first-born child.  Due to the construction 
of the outcome measure – the proportion of first births to the total number of births – 
investigating long-term fertility dynamics would be complicated as the corrective 
decrease in the number of first deliveries and an increase in the number of second and 
subsequent deliveries would be difficult to separate out.  For the purposes of this study, 
year 1968 therefore seems like a reasonable cutoff.  Unfortunately, limiting attention to 
years prior to 1969 excludes the effects of the family deferment elimination of April 1970 
from the analysis.   
Since the two series of the first-birth ratio likely followed a different (linear) time 
trend in 1963 to 1968 and since their seasonal pattern might have also differed, 
appropriate detrending and deseasonalizing had to be performed.  A continuous time 
variable and a full set of month dummies have been used.  This approach is similar to that 
in Card and Lemieux (2001, 2002) who regress the annual education outcomes on a 
linear inter-cohort time trend when estimating the effects of the Vietnam draft on college 
attendance. 
A simple visual examination of the detrended and deseasonalized series (Figure 3) 
suggests that the government draft policies very likely did have a significant impact on 
the fertility of the potential draftees.  In particular, while the residual ratios for the 
                                                 
6 Beginning in 1970, young men were at risk of induction for only one year rather than for the entire period 
between ages 18½ and 25, as was the case previously.  As Card and Lemieux (2001, 2002) note, the 
shortened period of exposure together with the relatively low rate of inductions after 1969 significantly 
reduced the incentives to pursue draft-avoidance strategies. 
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treatment and control groups followed a similar time path in the years 1963 to 1965, the 
treatment mothers experienced a much sharper increase in the proportion of first births in 
the summer of 1966.  That the control mothers experienced any increase at all may stem 
from the fact that maternal age is an imperfect proxy for paternal age and so that some of 
the women in the control group might have also reacted to the draft.  As further obvious 
from Figure 3, the two cohorts of mothers behaved somewhat differently towards the end 
of the studied period.  More specifically, the treatment mothers had a lower residual ratio 
of first-born babies about 12 and 22 months after the 1966 spike.  This is consistent with 
the fertility behavior (birth spacing in particular) prevalent in the U.S. at that time.  Based 
on data from the Natality Detail Files for the years 1969-1971,7 the distribution of the 
length of time between the first and the second live birth peaked at months 13 and 23 in 
the late 1960’s and early 1970’s (Figure 4).  A decreased number of first births coupled 
with an increased number of subsequent births in the years 1967 and 1968 by women 
who had responded to the Vietnam draft by advancing their first delivery to summer 1966 
may thus be responsible for the observed pattern. 
Regression Results 
To formally estimate the size and significance of the effect of the Vietnam draft 
rules on natality, I employ a difference-in-differences type of methodology.  In the 
                                                 
7 These are the first years when the information on birth spacing was recorded by at least some states.  
Obtaining this information for the years 1966-1968 would have been preferable since, if the number of first 
births was exogenously affected by the policy change, birth spacing might have been affected as well. 
Nevertheless, the stability of the birth spacing distribution in the 1969-1971 period makes extrapolation to 
the earlier years seem justifiable.  
 11
baseline specification of my model, I regress the detrended and deseasonalized “first-born 
infants/all infants” ratio on a dummy variable set equal to one for the treatment group, 
seven dummy variables set equal to one for months 8 to 14 after the August 1965 
Executive Order issuance (i.e., months 6 to 12 after the October 1965 Selective Service 
announcement), and seven interaction dummies set equal to one for observations on the 
treatment group in the exposed months.8  If the new policies did induce young women to 
time the conception of their first-born child in order to make the baby’s father exempt 
from the draft, the coefficients on the interaction dummies for months 9 and 10 after each 
of the new policies was announced should be positive and statistically significant.  In 
addition, since the announcements were made on August 26 and October 26, 1965, even 
a quick response by the potential draftees would likely increase the number of infants 
born in June 1966 (10 months after the Executive Order issuance) and August 1966 (10 
months after the Selective Service announcement) by more than the number of infants 
born in May and July 1966.  Therefore, the coefficients on the interaction dummies for 
months 10 and 12 after the Executive Order issuance (i.e., months 8 and 10 after the 
October 1965 Selective Service announcement) should be larger in magnitude. 
Results from my baseline OLS estimation are reported in the first column of 
Table 3.  Two of the interaction variables are positive and significant at the 95% 
confidence level: the interaction dummies for months 10 and 12 after the Executive Order 
issuance, i.e., months 8 and 10 after the Selective Service announcement.  The increased 
natality in June 1966 very likely represents a direct response to the Executive Order 
                                                 
8 As a robustness check, I have also estimated the main equation with detrending and deseasonalizing in 
one step.  This modification had no substantial impact on the results. 
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issuance and the increased natality in August 1966 is likely caused by the Selective 
Service announcement.  Even though statistically insignificant, the proportions of first 
births among treatment women are higher in July, September, and October 1966 as well 
and the gap diminishes over time. 
The second column of Table 3 reports results from a specification where 
teenagers (mothers 15-19 years old) are added to the treatment group.  In this case, the 
interaction dummies for June, July, August, and September 1966 are all positive, large, 
and statistically significant.  Taken together, the above results thus provide strongly 
suggestive evidence that the Vietnam War draft policy played a role in determining the 
timing, and perhaps the number, of births. 
Correction for Misclassification 
After estimating the baseline model, I explicitly acknowledge that some women 
might have been misclassified into the treatment and/or control group.  A recent paper 
(Lewbel 2003) demonstrates that as long as the misclassification probabilities are known 
to the researcher (for example from a validation sample or from aggregate population 
proportions), the true average treatment effect can be calculated as: τ* = τ/(p0+p1-1), 
where  τ  denotes the estimated (biased) treatment effect,  p0  is the proportion of 
untreated individuals in the control group,  p1  the proportion of truly treated individuals 
in the treatment group, and p0+p1>1.  (The Technical Appendix includes a more extensive 
discussion of this result and its use in adjusting my estimates.)  As obvious from the 
above formula, the true treatment effect is zero if and only if the estimated treatment 
effect is zero.  Furthermore, any misclassification into the treatment and/or control group 
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will bias the estimated treatment effect downward.  Therefore, my estimates of the effect 
of the deferment rules on natality are conservative.  If, for example, 65% of women in the 
baseline treatment group and 11% of women in the control group had babies with men of 
the draft-eligible age (as suggested by the Natality Detail File estimates), the correct 
magnitude of the baseline coefficients on the interaction dummies for months 10 and 12 
after the Executive Order issuance (i.e., months 8 and 10 after the Selective Service 
announcement) would be nearly double (0.016/(0.89+0.65-1)=0.030 and 
0.017/(0.89+0.65-1)=0.031, respectively).  Similarly, in the specification where teenagers 
are added to the treatment group, the corrected statistically significant coefficients 
(months 10 to 13 after the Executive Order issuance) would be 0.040, 0.025, 0.037, and 
0.026, respectively.  
To attach meaning to these estimates, I calculate the predicted increase in the 
number of births.  First, I consider the baseline case with no correction for 
misclassification.  Using the actual number of deliveries obtained from the Vital Statistics 
suggests that the number of first births increased by 6,488 as a result of the new draft 
policy announcements.9  Next, using the corrected treatment effects and recognizing that 
65% of mothers 20-24 years old and 11% of mothers 25-29 years old were “at risk” 
modifies the estimate to 8,283.  And, finally, using the baseline estimates but taking into 
                                                 
9 Let Y1 denote the number of first births, Y2 the number of subsequent births, and Z the policy change of 
interest.  Then, τ = ∂[Y1/(Y1+Y2)]/∂Z = [(∂Y1/∂Z)*( Y1+Y2)-Y1*(∂Y1/∂Z + ∂Y2/∂Z)]/( Y1+Y2)2, where 
∂Y2/∂Z is assumed  to be 0 (this assumption is verified in my analysis of subsequent births).  Thus, ∂Y1/∂Z 
= τ*(Y1+Y2)2/Y2.  Using the actual numbers of first and subsequent births to women 20-24 years old 
reported in the Vital Statistics yields: ∂Y1/∂Z = (0.016*107,0422/61,796 =) 2,967 (June 1966) + 
(0.017*116,8862/65,966 =) 3,521 (August 1966) = 6,488. 
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account that a fraction of the teenage group could have been affected by the new draft 
policies further increases the predicted effect to 15,532. 
When teenagers are directly added to the treatment group, the magnitude of the 
estimated effect increases further.  In particular, my results indicate that the number of 
first births might have increased by as many as 19,540 in June and August 1966.  In fact, 
when all the statistically significant coefficients from the alternative specification are 
employed, the predicted number of additional first births delivered between June and 
September 1966 rises to 32,914. 
Robustness Checks 
To check the robustness of the baseline results, several alternative specifications 
of the difference-in-differences model are estimated.10  First, I add dummy variables for 
all the remaining months after the Executive Order issuance as well as their interactions 
with the treatment dummy to the baseline regression.  This way, the Executive Order of 
August 1965 and the Selective Service announcement of October 1965 are allowed to 
have an effect on fertility throughout the entire period from September 1965 to December 
1968.  Results from this specification are very similar to those reported in the first 
column of Table 3. 
Next, I consider the possibility that the trend in the “first-born infants/all infants” 
ratio was not linear (for either the treatment or the control cohort) in the mid-1960’s.  To 
allow for this possibility, I follow Card and Lemieux (2001, 2002) and add a quadratic 
time variable to the simple linear time term and the full set of month dummies when 
                                                 
10 Results from all alternative estimations are available upon request. 
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detrending and deseasonalizing the original series.  I then use the residuals from this 
analysis in the difference-in-differences type of model.  The magnitude of the coefficients 
on the interaction dummies of interest (10 months after each of the policy changes) 
decreases only very slightly and both variables remain highly statistically significant.  
None of the other interaction dummies reaches statistical significance at the 95% 
confidence level.  As before, the main conclusions do not change when the full model 
(with dummies for all months after September 1965) is estimated. 
To verify the causality of the relationship, I also estimate the above models for a 
counterfactual - an artificial (i.e., unreal) policy change.  In particular, I assume that 
instead of being announced in the summer of 1965, the new draft rules were announced, 
alternatively, in the summer of 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, or 1967.  As hypothesized, the 
policy coefficients of interest never approach statistical significance in these models. 
Further, to verify that the number of subsequent births is not driving my results, I 
use the number of subsequent births instead of the “first-born infants/all infants” ratio as 
the dependent variable.  As expected, there is no difference between the treatment and 
control groups of mothers following the policy changes. 
Also, since the use of the “first-born infants/all infants” ratio imposes a functional 
restriction on the model, I replace this variable with the number of first birth and add the 
number of subsequent births as well as its interaction with the treatment group 
membership on the right-hand side (Table 4; note that the number of all births cannot be 
used due to endogeneity).  Both of the new regressors are positive and highly statistically 
significant but the main results remain qualitatively the same.  The magnitude of the 
estimates is very similar as well.  In particular, the new results indicate that the number of 
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first births increased by 2,576 and 3,759 in June and August 1965, respectively.  The sum 
of these two effects, i.e., 6,355 additional first births, is very close to the 6,488 additional 
births predicted by the baseline model (without correction for misclassification).11 
Finally, in order to formally test the joint hypothesis that the proportion of first 
births increased significantly in months 9 and 10 after each of the policy changes, I 
replace the individual dummies for months 9 to 12 after the Executive Order issuance 
(i.e., months 7 to 10 after the October 1965 Selective Service announcement) by a single 
dummy variable. As expected, the coefficient on this variable interacted with the 
treatment group membership is large and highly statistically significant (δ^=0.010, 
SE=0.004 for the baseline treatment group and δ^=0.017, SE=0.004 for the treatment 
group including teenagers).  Other coefficients in the model are unaffected by this 
change. 
Conclusions 
The magnitude of the effect of the Vietnam War paternity deferments on the 
decision to start a family estimated in this paper is quite substantial.  In particular, the 
calculated conservative increase in the number of first births by 15,532 in June and 
August 1966 represents over 7% of the total number of first deliveries in those two 
                                                 
11 I have also considered using a birth rate as the dependent variable. Unfortunately, monthly population 
estimates for the 1960s are not available (U.S. Census Bureau). Therefore, a birth rate would need to use 
annual population estimates in the denominator. Since the effects of the paternity deferment policies seem 
to be month-specific - concentrated 10 months after their enactment - adding annual population estimates to 
the dependent variable would not contribute to the estimation of this 10-month lag. 
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months.  It also corresponds to about 28% of the Selective Service System calls for 
inductees in those months (The Selective Service System 1968).  This finding adds to a 
growing body of evidence that government interventions may indeed affect individuals’ 
reproductive behavior.  It also adds to the list of potentially long lasting effects of the 
Vietnam War draft policies.  
How does this effect compare to the effects of monetary child benefits?  A good 
comparator is provided by Milligan (2005) who studies the fertility effects of the 
Allowance for Newborn Children (ANC) implemented between 1988 and 1997 in 
Quebec.  Milligan’s results seem particularly relevant because the ANC, like the paternity 
deferments studied here but unlike tax incentives and welfare benefits studied elsewhere, 
provided a universal child benefit independent of income but dependent on the number of 
previously born children.  Also, Milligan (2005) finds a greater fertility responsiveness to 
financial incentives than AFDC studies and so allows for a conservative estimate of the 
relative effect of paternity deferments as compared to monetary child benefits.  
In Milligan (2005), a newborn lump sum benefit of C$ 1,000 increases the 
probability that a childless woman of reproductive age will have a first child by 24.3%.  
In 1966, there were 1,007,324 first births to 15-24 year old women in the U.S.  As 
calculated in this study, at least 15,532 of those births are attributable to the paternity 
deferments, representing an increase of 1.6%.  Using Milligan’s results, the same effect 
could be achieved by paying ($C 1,000*1.6/24.3=) C$ 66 per child or over C$ 66 million 
for all the 1,007,324 first children born to mothers 15-24 years old in 1966.  Using year 
1995 exchange rate of C$ 1.37 for US$ 1.00 suggested in Milligan (2005) and converting 
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to 2006 dollars, the payment required to produce the same increase in births as that 
attributable to the Vietnam War paternity deferments would be US$ 64 million. 
An interesting question that remains is to what extent the increase in the number 
of births in the summer of 1966 translated into an increase in completed fertility and to 
what extent it represented a mere change in birth timing.  Unfortunately, this issue is 
difficult to address with existing data.  In an attempt to study subsequent fertility of 
women affected by the Vietnam draft, I have examined a sample from the 5% Public-Use 
Microdata Sample (PUMS) from the 1980 U.S. Census.  Women who were 20-24 years 
old in summer 1966 were 33-37 years old on the Census Day of April 1st, 1980.  I have 
created a subset of this group consisting of women who were ‘householders’ or ‘spouses’ 
in a family or ‘spouses’ or ‘parents’ in a subfamily where a child born between April and 
September (quarters 2 and 3) of 1966 was present.12  Since these children were 13 years 
old on the Census Day, they were still likely to be residing with their parents and so 
recorded in the PUMS dataset.  As defined in the 1980 Census, a ‘child’ refers to an own 
child, an adopted child, or a stepchild.  Therefore, I have limited my study group to 
women who had also had at least one previous birth.  This left 30,869 women in the study 
group and 365,884 women in the comparison group. 
A problem with comparing fertility behavior of women who had a child in spring 
or summer 1966 with their same-age counterparts who did not have a child in this period 
is that women who chose to become pregnant at age 20-24 are likely to differ 
systematically from other women in a way which affects their subsequent fertility 
behavior.  Indeed, as my data show, women who had started with childbearing early in 
life had higher fertility by age 33-37 than women in the comparison group (3.2 vs. 2.1 
                                                 
12 This method of matching children with mothers is similar to Angrist and Evans (1998). 
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children, respectively).  To mitigate this problem, I have selected a ‘straw man’ group 
from my sample and examined completed fertility of 33-37 year-old women who had 
conceived before the new deferment policies were announced and had a child in January-
March (quarter 1) of 1966.  As expected, these 13,744 women were slightly older than 
those delivering in April-September 1966 (35.13 vs. 35.09 years), were more likely to be 
Black (14.4 vs. 12.5%), and less likely to have completed high school (71.5 vs. 73.6%).  
However, the mean fertility of both groups was 3.2 children and even when controlling 
for age, race, and high school education, there was no statistical difference.  So, women 
who had a child in January-September 1966 clearly differ from their counterparts who 
did not have a child in this period but I could not detect any difference between women 
who were potentially affected by the new deferment policies and women who were not.  
While this could theoretically mean that women reacting to the policies adopted fertility 
behavior of those choosing to start childbearing at a young age, it more likely reflects the 
fact that the fraction of affected women in the study group is very small.  In particular, 
the 30,869 study women in the PUMS data represent 617,380 American women.  Since 
the predicted increase of 15,532 births attributed to the paternity deferments in this paper 
corresponds to only 2.5% of the overall population, it is unlikely that a cohort analysis 
would reveal significant differences even if they existed. 
The Census analysis has a couple of additional limitations.  First, I could not 
distinguish between own children and adopted or step-children.  Second, not all of the 
children used to construct the study sample were necessarily first-born children.  
Unfortunately, older children might have already left the household (and the dataset).  
Third, the PUMS data only reports the quarter – not the month – of birth.  As a result, the 
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window of April-September 1966 is wider than the period in which the effects of the 
paternity deferments were concentrated (i.e., June-August 1966).  These problems can be 
avoided by examining the CPS 1995 Fertility and Marital History Supplement.  From this 
dataset, I obtained the distribution of the lifetime number of births (completed fertility) 
for women 20-24 years old at their first delivery whose first child was born in the 
summer of 1966.  I then compared this distribution to the corresponding distributions for 
women whose first delivery occurred in the summers of 1962-1965 and 1967-1970.  
Unfortunately, the number of observations (about 80 each year – 753 in total) was too 
low to enable reliable comparisons.  Furthermore, the methodology used here and in the 
Census analysis above made it impossible to study the proportion of women with no 
births.  This is an important limitation since, as Ananat et al. (2004) note, zero is the only 
point in the fertility distribution for which there is an unambiguous prediction: in the case 
examined here, the proportion of childless women should fall.  Following Ananat et al. 
(2004), I have therefore considered a complementary approach.  In particular, I have used 
the method of cohort analysis to study completed fertility of women 10-14, 15-19, 20-24 
(the exposed group), 25-29, and 30-34 years old in the year 1966.  For the purposes at 
hand, however, this analysis proved too crude as the general decline in fertility over time 
strongly dominated any other fertility pattern. 
While it is not clear whether the paternity deferments affected completed fertility 
or the timing of birth, the consequences of either change - in terms of maternal education, 
labor market behavior, marital decisions, maternal and child health, and other outcomes – 
could be important.  For example, Rosenzweig and Schultz (1985) demonstrate that the 
effects of family size on female labor market outcomes can be significant.  Angrist and 
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Evans (1998) corroborate this finding and show that fertility reduces female labor supply 
especially among poor and less educated women.  Moreover, previous literature indicates 
that circumstances surrounding first birth specifically are important.  For example, using 
the National Longitudinal Survey, Shapiro and Mott (1994) show that the employment 
behavior surrounding first births in 1968-1973 is an important independent predictor of 
female lifetime work experience.  Jacobsen et al (1999) use the 1970 and 1980 U.S. 
Census data on married nulliparous women who gave birth to twins.  Using the twin child 
as an unplanned additional birth, they find that unplanned first births reduce female labor 
supply and earnings. 
Focusing on the consequences of teenage pregnancy, McElroy (1996) finds that 
having a birth as a teenager reduces the likelihood of high school completion and college 
enrollment even after controlling for observable factors that account for the lower socio-
economic status of teenage mothers during their childhood.  Hotz et al (2005) use 
miscarriages as an instrument to better control for the endogeneity of having a birth as a 
teenager.  They conclude that early childbearing does decrease high school completion 
but the effect is smaller than previously believed. 
With respect to the timing of birth and health, Royer (2004) investigates the 
effects of maternal age on birth outcomes.  Comparing outcomes across siblings born in 
Texas between 1989 and 2001, she concludes that “the ‘best’ age for first and second 
births is between 22 and 25” (p. 24) and that younger and older mothers face an elevated 
risk of preterm delivery, infant death, and child’s abnormal condition.  Thus, 20-24 year-
old women are at an ideal age for childbearing but to the extent the paternity deferments 
induced births among teenagers, they might have had a detrimental effect on infant 
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health.  Overall, the indirect evidence available suggests that by influencing natality, the 
draft deferments likely had other long lasting effects.  
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Figure 2. 
Proportion of 1st Births by Month and Year of Birth 
United States, 1961-1970
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Figure 3. 
 
Proportion of 1st Births by Month and Year of Birth 
United States, 1963-1968; Detrended and Deseasonalized
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Figure 4. 
Interval Since Last Live Birth for Second Births
United States, 1969-1971
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Table 1. Median Age of Brides and Grooms at the Time of First Marriage 
United States, 1963-1968 
 
Year Median age of brides Median age of grooms Difference in median age 
1963 20.3 22.5 2.2 
1964 20.5 23.0 2.5 
1965 20.4 22.5 2.1 
1966 20.3 22.6 2.3 
1967 20.8 22.9 2.1 
1968 20.6 22.4 1.8 
 
Source: National Center for Health Statistics, CDC (1967-71) 
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Table 2. Percentages of Fathers 19 to 25 Years Old by Mother’s Age 
United States, 1969-1971 
 
Year 1969 1970 1971 
% missing info on father’s age 9.18 9.70 9.89 
20 to 24 years old (baseline treatment group) 64.82 65.10 65.46 
15 to 24 years old (alternative treatment group) 68.30 68.33 68.62 
Mother’s age 
cohort 
25 to 29 years old (control group) 11.18 10.84 11.20 
 
Source: U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, National Center for Health Statistics (1970-72) 
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Table 3. The Effects of the Vietnam War Paternity Deferments on the Proportion of 
1st Births; United States, 1963-1968; OLS Estimation 
 
Variable Parameter estimate 
 Baseline 
treatment 
group (20-24 
years old) 
Alternative 
treatment 
group (15-24 
years old) 
Treatment cohort -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
8 months after the Executive Order 11241 issuance/ 6 months after the 
October 1965 Selective Service announcement  
-0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
9 months after the Executive Order 11241 issuance/ 7 months after the 
October 1965 Selective Service announcement 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
10 months after the Executive Order 11241 issuance/ 8 months after 
the October 1965 Selective Service announcement 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
11 months after the Executive Order 11241 issuance/ 9 months after 
the October 1965 Selective Service announcement 
0.004 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
12 months after the Executive Order 11241 issuance/ 10 months after 
the October 1965 Selective Service announcement 
0.002 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
13 months after the Executive Order 11241 issuance/ 11 months after 
the October 1965 Selective Service announcement 
0.002 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
14 months after the Executive Order 11241 issuance/ 12 months after 
the October 1965 Selective Service announcement 
0.007 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
8 months after the Executive Order 11241 issuance/ 6 months after the 
October 1965 Selective Service announcement * Treatment cohort  
-0.003 
(0.008) 
0.007 
(0.008) 
9 months after the Executive Order 11241 issuance/ 7 months after the 
October 1965 Selective Service announcement * Treatment cohort 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
10 months after the Executive Order 11241 issuance/ 8 months after 
the October 1965 Selective Service announcement * Treatment cohort 
0.016** 
(0.008) 
0.023*** 
(0.008) 
11 months after the Executive Order 11241 issuance/ 9 months after 
the October 1965 Selective Service announcement * Treatment cohort 
0.007 
(0.008) 
0.014* 
(0.008) 
12 months after the Executive Order 11241 issuance/ 10 months after 
the October 1965 Selective Service announcement * Treatment cohort 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
0.021*** 
(0.008) 
13 months after the Executive Order 11241 issuance/ 11 months after 
the October 1965 Selective Service announcement * Treatment cohort 
0.011 
(0.008) 
0.015** 
(0.008) 
14 months after the Executive Order 11241 issuance/ 12 months after 
the October 1965 Selective Service announcement * Treatment cohort 
0.003 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
 
The dependent variable is the linearly detrended and deseasonalized proportion of first births to all U.S. 
births (144 observations).  An intercept term (not statistically significant) was included in the model.  
Standard errors are given in parentheses.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 99%, 95%, 
and 90% confidence levels, respectively. 
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Table 4. The Effects of the Vietnam War Paternity Deferments on the Number of 1st 
Births; United States, 1963-1968; OLS Estimation 
 
Variable Parameter estimate 
 Baseline treatment group 
(20-24 years old) 
Treatment cohort 455.19 
(6423.44) 
Number of subsequent births 0.31*** 
(0.05) 
Number of subsequent births* Treatment cohort 0.35*** 
(0.09) 
8 months after the Executive Order 11241 issuance/ 6 months after the 
October 1965 Selective Service announcement  
-20.28 
(950.42) 
9 months after the Executive Order 11241 issuance/ 7 months after the 
October 1965 Selective Service announcement 
419.63 
(978.87) 
10 months after the Executive Order 11241 issuance/ 8 months after 
the October 1965 Selective Service announcement 
140.84 
(969.92) 
11 months after the Executive Order 11241 issuance/ 9 months after 
the October 1965 Selective Service announcement 
1358.64 
(1015.25) 
12 months after the Executive Order 11241 issuance/ 10 months after 
the October 1965 Selective Service announcement 
862.29 
(982.75) 
13 months after the Executive Order 11241 issuance/ 11 months after 
the October 1965 Selective Service announcement 
841.22 
(976.81) 
14 months after the Executive Order 11241 issuance/ 12 months after 
the October 1965 Selective Service announcement 
1357.21 
(978.84) 
8 months after the Executive Order 11241 issuance/ 6 months after the 
October 1965 Selective Service announcement * Treatment cohort  
-1256.40 
(1344.63) 
9 months after the Executive Order 11241 issuance/ 7 months after the 
October 1965 Selective Service announcement * Treatment cohort 
-966.06 
(1379.01) 
10 months after the Executive Order 11241 issuance/ 8 months after 
the October 1965 Selective Service announcement * Treatment cohort 
2576.34* 
(1391.64) 
11 months after the Executive Order 11241 issuance/ 9 months after 
the October 1965 Selective Service announcement * Treatment cohort 
1476.56 
(1446.25) 
12 months after the Executive Order 11241 issuance/ 10 months after 
the October 1965 Selective Service announcement * Treatment cohort 
3758.99*** 
(1407.67) 
13 months after the Executive Order 11241 issuance/ 11 months after 
the October 1965 Selective Service announcement * Treatment cohort 
2430.89* 
(1382.85) 
14 months after the Executive Order 11241 issuance/ 12 months after 
the October 1965 Selective Service announcement * Treatment cohort 
1134.80 
(1372.37) 
 
The dependent variable is the linearly detrended and deseasonalized number of first U.S. births (144 
observations).  An intercept term was included in the model.  Standard errors are given in parentheses.  *** 
and * denote statistical significance at the 99% and 90% confidence levels, respectively. 
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Technical Appendix: Estimation of Average Treatment Effects with 
Misclassification 
 
Based on: Lewbel, Arthur. 2003. “Estimation of Average Treatment Effects with Misclassification,” 
Working Paper.  (Especially “Identification by Known Misclassification Probabilities” – pp. 5-8 and “Proof 
of Theorem 1” – pp. 24-25) - http://www2.bc.edu/~lewbel/mistrea11.pdf 
 
Notation: 
 
Y observed outcome 
T* actual treatment 
T reported treatment 
t = 1 receiving treatment 
t = 0 no treatment 
Y(t) outcome from treatment T* = t 
X vector of observable covariates 
 
 
 
 
Definitions: 
 
p0(x) = E[I(T*=0)|X=x, T=0] = D/(C+D) = D/T2 (= 0.89) 
p1(x) = E[I(T*=1)|X=x, T=1] = A/(A+B) = A/T1 (= 0.65) 
? the relative sizes of groups “T=1” and “T=0” do not matter for the calculation 
of p0(x) and p1(x) 
 
b0(x) = E[I(T=1)|X=x, T*=0] = B/(B+D) 
b1(x) = E[I(T=0)|X=x, T*=1] = C/(A+C) 
? the relative sizes of groups “T=1” and “T=0” do matter for the calculation of 
b0(x) and b1(x) 
 
r*(x) = E[T*|X=x] 
 
ht*(x) = E[Y|X=x, T*=t] = (from assumption #2 below) E[Y|X=x, T*=t, T]  
 
τ*(x) = E[Y|X=x, T*=1] - E[Y|X=x, T*=0] = h1*(x) – h0*(x) = (from assumption #1 
below) E[Y(1)-Y(0)|X=x] ? the average treatment effect 
 
τ(x) = E[Y|X=x, T=1] - E[Y|X=x, T=0] 
A         D 
B C 
T1: T = 1 T2: T = 0 
T* = 1 
T* = 0 
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Assumptions (pp. 5-7 in Lewbel 2003): 
 
1. unconfoundedness: E[Y(t)|T*, X] = E[Y(t)|X] ? treatment group membership has 
no effect on outcomes other than through the effects of treatment itself ? O.K. 
 
2. E[Y|X, T*, T] = E[Y|X, T*] ? assignment into the treatment group has no effect 
on outcomes when true treatment group membership is controlled for ? O.K. 
 
3. i) b0(x) + b1(x) < 1 
(b0(x) + b1(x) = 0.35*T1/(0.35*T1+0.89*T2) + 0.11*T2/(0.11T2+0.65T1) 
= (0.0385*T1*T2 + 0.2275*T12 + 0.0385*T1*T2 + 0.0979 T22)/ 
(0.0385*T1*T2 + 0.2275*T12 + 0.5785*T1*T2 + 0.0979 T22) < 1)  
? O.K. 
 
ii) E[T*|X=x, T=1] ≠ E[T*|X=x, T=0] 
(E[T*|X=x, T=1] = 0.65 ≠ E[T*|X=x, T=0] = 0.11) 
? O.K. 
 
iii) 0 < r*(x) < 1 
r*(x) = (A+C)/(A+B+C+D) ? O.K.  
 
4. τ(x) is identified, i.e., consistently estimated 
 
Derivation (pp. 24-25 in Lewbel 2003): 
 
E[Y|X=x, T=1] = E[Y|X=x, T=1, T*=0]*Pr(T*=0|X=x, T=1) + E[Y|X=x, T=1, 
T*=1]*Pr(T*=1|X=x, T=1) = h0*(x)[1- p1(x)] + h1*(x) p1(x) 
 
E[Y|X=x, T=0] = E[Y|X=x, T=0, T*=0]*Pr(T*=0|X=x, T=0) + E[Y|X=x, T=0, 
T*=1]*Pr(T*=1|X=x, T=0) = h0*(x) p0(x) + h1*(x)[1-p0(x)] 
 
? τ(x) = h0*(x)[1- p1(x)] + h1*(x) p1(x) - h0*(x) p0(x) - h1*(x)[1-p0(x)]  
= h0*(x)[1- p0(x) – p1(x)] + h1*(x)[-1+ p0(x) + p1(x)] = [h1*(x) – h0*(x)][p0(x) + p1(x) - 1] 
= τ*(x) [p0(x) + p1(x) - 1] 
 
? τ*(x) = τ(x)/ [p0(x) + p1(x) - 1] 
 
(τ*(x) = τ(x)/ [0.89 + 0.65 - 1] = τ(x)/0.54) 
 
 
